I am the boss of me: The executive function of self-awareness in 3- and 4-year-olds

The current research explored the thesis that cognitive self-recognition might have an executive function in 3- and 4-year-olds. Although it is well established that children recognise themselves in mirrors by the end of infancy, the cognitive and behavioural impact of this capacity has yet to be elucidated. Experiments 1 to 6 showed that preschool children could form and maintain a cognitive link between the self and external stimuli, as a result of which, self-referent stimuli were given mnemonic priority. Experiments 4 to 8 indicated that in tasks involving self-recognition, 3- and 4-year-olds’ ability to process other-referent stimuli was compromised by self-focus. Finally, Experiments 9 and 10 demonstrated that mirror self-recognition increased preschoolers’ tendency to self-regulate, leading them to behave in line with socially accepted standards. Together, these experiments provide novel evidence to confirm that cognitive self-recognition has a role in preschoolers’ performance on tasks requiring memory, attention, inhibition, and planning. This implies that when salient, the self may become the ultimate executer of behaviour. By observing 3- and 4-year-olds’ differential processing of self- and other-referent stimuli we infer the existence of a functionally active, self-reflective agent. Moreover, the role of the self is temporally extended, influencing children’s cognition and behaviour in the past (Experiment 1 to 3), present (Experiments 4 to 8) and future (Experiments 9 to 10). This implies that preschool children may have developed the foundations necessary to build the experience of personal identity

He Looks Guilty : Reforming Good Character Evidence to Undercut The Presumption of Guilt.

Juries often use short-cuts to determine the character of the accused, such as their job, age, race, gender, marital status, or what the person looks like. These short-cuts often substitute for character evidence in courtrooms across the United States, adding to the divide in the criminal justice system today. This problem provides a lens to examine the character evidence rules and how they are implemented. Rules governing good and bad character evidence themselves have been turned on their head. A defendant’s right to put in good character has been called “deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence.” Nevertheless, the rules currently exclude almost all good character evidence from criminal trials. Ostensibly, defendants are protected from bad character evidence because “a defendant must be tried for what he did not for who he is.” Nevertheless, there has been tremendous growth in the introduction of uncharged bad conduct in the past decade. Character evidence must be understood in the context of the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence is not necessarily assured. If the accusation of criminal wrong-doing fits with stereotypes that jurors walk in with, the accusation is more likely to stick. Good criminal defense attorneys try to put on evidence that will humanize their client to the jury and reassert a presumption of innocence. Alternately, evidence of other wrong-doing often exacerbates prejudice so that jurors are even less likely to give the presumption of innocence that the law requires. To help rectify the problem of negative stereotyping, it is time to consider amending the character evidence rules